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Abstract
Whereas to most logicians, the word “theorem” refers to any statement which has been shown to be
true, to mathematicians, the word “Theorem” is, relatively speaking, rarely applied, and denotes
something far more special. In this paper, we examine some of the underlying reasons behind this
diﬀerence in terminology, and we show how this discrepancy might be exploited, in order to build
a computer system which automatically selects the latter type of “Theorems” from amongst the
former. Indeed, we have begun building the automated discovery system MATHsAiD, the design
of which is based upon our research. We provide some preliminary results produced by this system,
and compare these results to Theorems appearing in various mathematics textbooks.
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1 Introduction
Whereas to most logicians, the word “theorem” refers to any statement which
has been shown to be true, to mathematicians, the word “Theorem” 5 is,
1 The authors are supported by EPSRC MathFIT grant GR/S31099.
2 Email: rmccasla@inf.ed.ac.uk
3 Email: A.Bundy@ed.ac.uk
4 Email: pfs@maths.gla.ac.uk
5 Throughout this work, “theorems” will be used to denote truths in the logicians’ sense,
whereas “Theorems” will denote those truths which mathematicians would typically con-
sider worth recording, including lemmas, corollaries, propositions, etc. Of course, some
allowances should be made for diﬀerences of opinion.
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relatively speaking, rarely applied, and denotes something far more special.
In this paper, we examine some of the underlying reasons behind this diﬀerence
in terminology, and we show how this discrepancy might be exploited, in order
to build a computer system which automatically selects the “Theorems” from
amongst the “theorems”.
The importance of this distinction should not be underestimated, since it
would seem that the ability on the part of mathematicians to ‘separate the
wheat from the chaﬀ’ (in their view) plays a major role in enabling them
to continue making new discoveries, while not recording so many theorems
that they are unable to cope with all the data. It seems reasonable to expect
that, should a machine learning or an artiﬁcial intelligence system be able to
mimic, at least to some extent, this same ability, then this system might also
be able to continue “discovering” new Theorems, avoiding the usual scaling-up
diﬃculties. In particular, such a system could quite conceivably prove very
useful in certain applications (e.g., formal methods), where at present, it is
diﬃcult to dispatch all the proof obligations that arise, without ﬁrst ﬁnding
and proving some necessary (or, at least, helpful) Lemmas. In any event,
short of ﬁnding some means of identifying those truths which are in some
sense new, the alternatives for any such system would be either to store every
newly discovered “theorem” (in the logicians’ sense), or to store none – in
eﬀect, either memorize everything, or learn nothing.
We have, in fact, begun building a computer system, called MATH-
sAiD (Mechanically Ascertaining Theorems from Hypotheses, Axioms and
Deﬁnitions), with the main goal being to automatically discover and identify
truths that mathematicians would call Theorems. Although this work is still
in relatively early stages, the results are quite promising. The reader should
understand, though, that this paper is not intended to provide a system-
description – nor is it intended to explain in detail our methods of generating 6
the theorems, from which the Theorems are chosen. Rather, at present, we
concentrate on the principles and the philosophy behind the Theorem-ﬁltering
part of the system. We do, however, include in the Appendix a sample of state-
ments that MATHsAiD has selected as Theorems. It should perhaps be noted
that our research has beneﬁted from the fact that two of the authors have had
6 Roughly speaking, whenever MATHsAiD is given a collection of axioms (deﬁnitions) to
investigate, it sets up a sequence of sets of hypotheses, and for each set of hypotheses, in turn,
it uses a forward-chaining process to generate theorems that follow from these hypotheses –
bearing in mind the criteria described in section 3. The sequence is determined by the nature
of each of the axioms. That is to say, the axioms are divided into classes (e.g., relations,
operations, closure-type, etc.), and each class is treated in such a way as to (hopefully, at
least) enable MATHsAiD to ﬁnd the more routine results one might look for, in regards to
said class.
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considerable experience in mathematical research, and another author, who
was trained as a logician, has had considerable experience in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence research. It should also be noted that our ideas have been inﬂuenced,
in no small part, by the work expressed in [4] and [6].
The authors are aware of others who have done somewhat related work
(see, for example, [2], [3], [5], [7] and [11]). However, to our knowledge, no
one else has taken our approach to this particular problem, nor has anyone
achieved entirely satisfactory results.
2 Some Alternative Approaches
Before moving on, we brieﬂy mention some alternative approaches, which we
and others 7 have considered. One could attempt to apply various heuristics,
the most popular of which seems to be “interestingness”. However, we believe
that trying to quantify “interestingness” is neither practical nor useful, since
this notion, at least as it is applied to mathematical Theorems, is entirely
relative. 8 Not only will there be some disagreement amongst various mathe-
maticians in this regard, but what is interesting to a particular mathematician
today, will not necessarily be of interest to him (or her) a year hence. At any
rate, most of the Theorems, as recorded in textbooks, would likely not score
terribly well, as judged by mathematicians, in the “interestingness” category.
Nevertheless, mathematicians would, as a rule, agree that the same Theorems
are appropriately labelled as such.
Alternatively, one could attempt to measure “importance” or “usefulness”.
For example, one could count the number of times a given theorem is used in
proving successive theorems, and then select as Theorems only those truths
whose count exceeds some threshold. One can even expand this further, by
attaching weights to each of the successive theorems, and adjusting the count
for the given theorem accordingly. At ﬁrst glance, this approach might seem
somewhat promising. However, many of the tools which mathematicians ﬁnd
most useful in their research, would not, in fact, be considered by them to be
Theorems. Moreover, the outcome would depend heavily upon the character-
istics of the theorem prover used, and upon the order in which the material
is introduced. We therefore expect that the results of this approach would be
less than satisfactory.
7 See the references towards the end of the preceeding section.
8 Indeed, the whole notion as to what precisely constitutes a mathematical Theorem is, to
some degree, relative. There is, in fact, no “gold standard” against which we might measure
our results. That said, by comparing our results with mathematics textbooks (see section
4), we can get some sense as to whether our eﬀorts have met with at least some success.
R.L. McCasland et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 151 (2006) 21–38 23
In fact, from our point of view, the main drawback to this approach – and
indeed, the approach used by most other existing systems – is that it in no
way captures the human mathematical process 9 , and is therefore contrary to
our basic philosophy (see section 3). This, in fact, is the primary diﬀerence
between our system and the others already mentioned.
3 Mathematics and Logic
Our basic philosophy, regarding MATHsAiD, is that all methods used in the
system should, in some sense, preserve the human mathematical process, inso-
far as it is both possible and prudent. We believe that, by and large, the more
closely we adhere to the human process, the better the results – and the more
likely that such desirable traits (e.g., “importance”, “usefulness”, “novelty”,
etc.) will be found amongst the results, without our having to either search
for, or measure them directly.
For this paper, we focus on identifying how mathematicians determine
which truths to call Theorems, and which to set aside – true though they may
be. In this regard, we have found four main properties which help mathe-
maticians to do just that. The ﬁrst is that every Theorem should satisfy the
property of being, at least in some sense, new. The next two properties work in
tandem; each Theorem should either be as simple as possible, or else provide
a sharper bound than any previously discovered Theorem. The last property
stems from the fact that mathematicians tend to prefer logical equivalences,
whenever they can get them – subject to the ﬁrst property, that is. Therefore,
for each Theorem identiﬁed by MATHsAiD, as well as for each axiom given,
the system tries to prove the converse, provided that the converse is in some
sense a substantive statement.
It is fair to say that these ideas are all rather simple. This, in our view, is
one of the main strengths of our approach, since quite often, it is the simplest
ideas which produce the best results.
3.1 Already Known vs Newly Discovered
Consider again the fact that, to most logicians, every proven statement should
be called a theorem. This suggests that, insofar as their thinking is concerned,
every true statement is deemed to be as important (or as unimportant) as
9 In particular, other systems rely on existing ATP’s to provide many of the measures
used in determining “interestingness”, “usefulness”, “novelty”, etc. Eﬀective and eﬃcient
as ATP’s are, they do not capture the mathematical process, as practiced by humans. In
particular, no attempt is made by other systems to distinguish between “mathematics” and
“logic”.
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every other true statement. Were this not the case, then one would expect
the nomenclature to diﬀerentiate amongst the various types of truths.
On the other hand, mathematicians have lots of diﬀerent names for what
they perceive to be diﬀerent sorts of truths (e.g., Lemma, Theorem 10 , Corol-
lary), suggesting that mathematicians not only want to make a distinction as
to the importance of various truths, but also to provide a sense of the history
in the discovery of those truths. That is, a Lemma 11 is typically so-called
because it has been useful in proving a Theorem, and a Corollary typically
follows easily from a Theorem. Crucially, however, most theorems are consid-
ered by mathematicians to be unworthy of any sort of special name.
Practically every mathematician has either read, heard, or spoken the
phrase, “It can easily be shown that...”, or the statement, “This result is
already known”. While each of these lines is sometimes used in a rather con-
descending manner, the truth behind them helps to underline the diﬀerence
between the logician’s and the mathematician’s points of view.
Of course, to a mathematician, “already known”, does not, by any stretch,
simply apply to those statements which have already been published. Consider
the reputation amongst mathematicians for being able, upon looking at a
Theorem, to fairly quickly infer several other conclusions – more so than would
likely be apparent to the uninitiated. It follows that, to a mathematician,
once a Theorem has been “newly discovered”, then many other theorems
immediately become “known” as well. For this reason, these other theorems
are not considered to be new Theorems 12 .
Purely for the sake of convenience, let us assume that the notion of “already
known” is well-deﬁned. One could then build an ascending chain of sets Kt
of statements which are understood to be already known at time t, with the
initial state K0 being the set consisting of the axioms, along with the rules
of logic. As already suggested, from a mathematician’s perspective, when a
theorem s has newly become known at time t (thus s /∈ Kt), then there exists
a set St (to which s belongs) of statements that have now likewise become
“newly known”. As such, then, we have Kt+1 = Kt ∪ St. It should be noted
that mathematicians would not necessarily declare s, or for that matter, any
other member of St, to be a Theorem.
Admittedly, the notion of “already known” is not at all necessarily well-
deﬁned. Not only is the choice of s wide open, but there would almost certainly
be at least some disagreement amongst mathematicians about the contents of
10 In this paragraph, the word Theorem refers to statements given this speciﬁc title by
mathematicians – as opposed to our meaning of this word throughout the rest of this work.
11 It must be said that logicians also refer to Lemmas.
12Aside from the occasional Corollary, that is.
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Kt+1, even if there were agreement on the choice of s. That said, mathe-
maticians would most likely agree that the cardinality of St is almost always
greater than 1, whereas logicians would probably say that the cardinality of
St is always 1.
In any event, in practical terms, we do not need to, nor do we want to
actually compute either of the sets Kt or St, for any value t. Our main priority
is to make certain, for any statement s which we might consider calling a
Theorem, that s is not “already known” 13 – however vague that notion might
be. We are, after all, only attempting to ﬁnd a sort of ‘best approximation’ to
the human mathematical process.
3.2 Mathematics or Logic
Both mathematicians and logicians agree that every step in a proof must be
logically sound, and likewise they generally agree on the types of arguments
allowed in a proof. Indeed, both groups make certain distinctions amongst
the sort of proof steps used, though the distinctions made by mathematicians
would likely be rather coarser than those made by logicians. That said, both
groups accept that there is a diﬀerence between ‘logical’ and ‘mathematical’
proof steps.
The diﬀerence lies in what one does with these distinctions. A mathe-
matician tends to view logic merely as one of several tools – an indispensable
tool, no doubt – but a tool, nonetheless. Rather like an astronomer with a
telescope, who would rather look through the telescope than at it, a mathe-
matician prefers to study mathematics, and logic provides a means of doing
just that.
Thus, from their vantage point, mathematicians perceive not only the ax-
ioms, the logic, and the (already discovered) Theorems to be “already known”,
but also any statements which, in their view, are trivially derived from any of
these. By ‘trivially derived’, we mean, roughly speaking, anything that can be
proven, using only (what mathematicians think of as) logic steps. Thus, in the
notation above, once a statement s has been proven, then St would contain all
statements trivially derivable from s, perhaps in combination with any mem-
bers of Kt. Or in other words, for mathematicians to consider a statement to
be new (and therefore, a potential candidate as a Theorem), its proof must
contain something that they can identify as mathematics.
Therefore, in MATHsAiD, we attempt to distinguish (as mathematicians
13As an example of how this is currently implemented in MATHsAiD, once the commuta-
tivity and associativity of intersection is known, then so too is any simple combination of
the two properties – e.g., A ∩ (B ∩ C) = C ∩ (A ∩B).
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would) between ‘logical’ and ‘mathematical’ proof steps. In order, then, for
any proven statement to be reported as a Theorem, it’s proof must contain
at least one ‘mathematical’ step. Of course, this is a necessary, 14 but not a
suﬃcient condition.
To take a very simple example, we again consider the commutativity of
intersection. Obviously, this property is a consequence of the commutativity
of the logical ‘and’. However, to most mathematicians 15 , the commutativity
of ‘and’ is not a Theorem (it is only logical!). On the other hand, the com-
mutativity of the mathematical concept of intersection is a Theorem, because
neither the intersect axiom nor the commutativity of ‘and’ tells us explicitly
that intersection commutes; we must have the mathematical step of converting
from ‘and’ to ‘intersect’.
3.3 Simplicity
Mathematicians are notorious for always wanting statements to be in ‘simplest’
form. We believe that this tendency on their part not only derives from a deep
sense of the nature of reality – physicists and mathematicians alike generally
hold the tenet that the simplest explanations are the ones closest to the Truth
– but from practical considerations as well. They ﬁnd it quite helpful to assign
names to certain concepts, in particular the more useful ones. In eﬀect, by
providing an equivalent, but simpler form, they are telling one another what
they think is important.
They are also, as it happens, giving us a means of identifying Theorems –
namely, simplicity. Within a class of equivalent statements, it is usually the
simplest one which mathematicians choose – if any one is chosen – to record
as a Theorem. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, and we discuss
one of these exceptions in the next section.
However, it is not just the simplest among a collection of equivalent state-
ments that seems special to mathematicians. During the discovery process,
whilst following a particular line of reasoning, a mathematician might prove
many statements, perhaps few of which are equivalent to each other. The
resulting sequence of theorems can vary substantially, with regards to the
simplicity of each. Again, within this sequence, it is usually the simplest
statement, if any, that a mathematician chooses to call a Theorem.
Not surprisingly, then, in MATHsAiD, we consider (as a rule) only the
14There is one exception to this rule; whenever a converse of either an axiom or a Theorem
is true, then this converse is also reported as a Theorem. See section 3.5.
15Mathematical logicians would more than likely disagree. But again, it depends upon
what one is trying to achieve. After all, one’s perception depends, to a considerable degree,
upon one’s focus.
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simplest statements as potential theorems. The simplicity comparison is made
between equivalent statements, and between statements, one of whose proof
list 16 is contained within the other’s. This latter comparison represents the
line of reasoning mentioned above. The only exceptions to this simplicity rule,
thus far, at least, are discussed in the next two sections.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The simplicity measure of a mathematical statement S is
given by the sum of the measures of the functors of S, where every functor
measures one, except ‘equals’, which has measure one-tenth, and quantiﬁers,
each of which has measure one-fourth.
To illustrate the simplicity comparison, 17 we provide two examples. 18 It
turns out that when MATHsAiD ﬁnds the result A ∩ A = A (given that A is
a set), it also ﬁnds that A ∩ (A ∩ A) = A. The latter result of course follows
from the former, and indeed, its proof list contains the former’s. One might
suppose that this is suﬃcient reason for its being discarded, rather than for
failing the simplicity test. The next example shows that this is not the case.
Given that a, b ∈ G (where G is a group) and b ∗ a = e, MATHsAiD ﬁnds,
in succession, that a−1 is equal to each of the terms e ∗ a−1, (b ∗ a) ∗ a−1,
b ∗ (a ∗ a−1), and b ∗ e. Finally, it ﬁnds that a−1 = b. The proof list of this last
equality thus contains the proof list for each of the preceeding equalities, but
of course, the last equation is the simplest.
3.4 Sharpness
In certain situations, mathematicians prefer results which are not necessarily
the simplest possible. One such situation involves statements dealing with an
ordering of some sort. In this case, a sharper bound is generally preferred.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let ≺ be a transitive relation on a set S, and let x, y, z ∈ S,
such that x ≺ z and y ≺ z. Then y is said to be a (strictly) sharper bound
than x (on z) if x ≺ y and y ⊀ x.
For example, if it is true that for certain sets A,B, and C, we have both
A ⊆ B and A∪C ⊆ B, then a mathematician would probably want to record
the latter fact as a Theorem, and ignore the former – provided, that is, that
A ∪ C does not turn out to be equal to A. The reason for this preference is
that since containment is a partial ordering (or more speciﬁcally, a transitive
relation), and since we always have A ⊆ A ∪ C, then one can easily deduce
16A list that records all the steps involved in the proof of the given statement.
17Note that no regard is given to the arity of any functors. We have, in fact, tried using
more complicated measures. However, this relatively simple measure seems to work best.
18The corresponding Theorems can be found in the Appendix.
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the former from the latter. The reverse, of course, does not follow. Note that,
should A∪C = A, then the simplicity rule above should apply, meaning that
we would prefer the former result.
In MATHsAiD, whenever a relation is introduced, the system tries to de-
termine whether the relation satisﬁes the usual properties one looks for in rela-
tions; namely, reﬂexivity, symmetry, anti-symmetry, and transitivity. Should
the relation be found to be transitive, but not an equivalence relation, then
the default setting (adjustable by the user) is to treat this relation henceforth
as a type of ordering, and determine future Theorems on the basis of sharp-
ness, rather than simplicity. This is, however, subject to the condition (as
mentioned above) that if two terms are equal, then preference is given to the
simpler term.
The reason for having the aforementioned setting be adjustable, is that
there are, not surprisingly, exceptions to the preference for sharper bounds.
For example, given positive integers a, b, c, d such that a < b and c < d,
the conclusion that a + c < b + d is considered to be a Theorem, despite
the existence of sharper results, say, a + c < b + c, for example. Moreover,
‘implication’ is certainly a transitive (not an equivalence) relation, but in this
case, one would tend to prefer the bounds reversed. For example, if one knew
that A =⇒ B and that B =⇒ C, then one would likely choose A =⇒ C as a
Theorem, over the other two statements. This choice would usually be made,
without regard to the simplicity of the respective arguments, but rather to
the fact that the weaker hypothesis produces a stronger, and therefore more
useful, overall result.
3.5 Converses
Among the various types of Theorems, mathematicians tend to value equiv-
alences more highly than most. So much so, in fact, that they are usually
willing to overlook it, should one of the implications be deemed unworthy, on
its own, to be called a Theorem. This is, of course, provided that its converse
is judged to be able to stand on its own. Quite simply, if an implication and
its converse are both true, then the two of them together are more useful than
either on its own.
For this reason, in MATHsAiD, whenever an implication is known, either as
an axiom or as a Theorem, then an attempt 19 is made to prove its converse.
19Only a ‘reasonable’ attempt, that is. Most of the time, a converse will not, in fact, be
true. Thus a balance should be struck, between exerting enough eﬀort to prove at least the
routine results, whilst not wasting too much time and eﬀort in trying to prove something
that isn’t true.
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Should this attempt succeed, then the converse is added 20 as a Theorem,
without regard to any of the preceding conditions.
4 Results
Thus far, we have tested MATHsAiD in set-theory, the positive integers (with-
out induction – that will come later), and in group theory. In each setting, we
have only explored the very basics, but we would expect this to be suﬃcient,
in order to see how well our Theorem ﬁlters work. The Theorems identiﬁed
by MATHsAiD from each area are included in the Appendix, along with the
axioms provided to the system, and compared with the Theorems listed in
various textbooks on each subject. Note that, due to the variations in style
amongst diﬀerent authors, we have likewise allowed for some variations in
what constitutes a Theorem in the textbooks. Certainly, any statement that
has a speciﬁc label (e.g., Lemma, Corollary, etc.) is counted. In addition, if
an unlabelled statement is set apart in some way, according to some pattern
established within the text, along with some proof of the statement, then it
too is counted as a Theorem. However, exercises are not counted as Theo-
rems, although we point them out, when they match either a MATHsAiD or
another textbook’s Theorem.
In addition to the Theorems found by MATHsAiD, we also include each
Theorem (as described above) found in the surveyed textbooks, that could
reasonably be expected to have been found by MATHsAiD, given the axioms 21
and deﬁnitions provided to MATHsAiD. It turns out that MATHsAiD can –
in manual mode – ﬁnd at least some of these extra Theorems; the users of
MATHsAiD may provide their own hypotheses to the system, and thereby
generate more Theorems (as, indeed, we have done). However, for the purposes
of this study, we only give MATHsAiD credit for the Theorems it generates
in automatic mode.
It should be noted that the axioms provided to MATHsAiD, in some cases,
diﬀer somewhat from those listed in the textbooks in this survey. For our
purposes, however, at least in the examples provided, this does not seem to be
all that pertinent. The one exception is in the deﬁnition of intersection given
in [9], which is marked in the corresponding table.
We would like to point out that the discrepancies between MATHsAiD and
20We would, of course, tend to prefer the equivalence as a Theorem, rather than either of
the two individual implications. For this paper, however, we have preserved the results,
including the order of discovery, just as MATHsAiD produced them.
21 For the time being, some “routine” information must also be provided by the user; e.g.,
the type of predicate involved, be it a relation, an operation, etc. It is expected that this
can be automated in the future.
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each of the textbooks seem to be quite in line with the discrepancies amongst
the textbooks themselves. It is somewhat interesting to note that, when it
comes to Theorems that have both a left- and a right-handed version (e.g.,
the distributivity laws), MATHsAiD sometimes produces both versions, and
sometimes only one. As it happens, this same phenomenon also occurs within
textbooks.
We provide a summary of the results in the following tables, but we encour-
age the readers to examine the individual Theorems recorded in the Appendix,
and to judge for themselves whether each so-called Theorem is indeed justly
named. In each table, we compare MATHsAiD to two textbooks, and we give
two scores – a stringent score and a more generous score – for each source
of Theorems. Both scores, as deﬁned below, are computed in the same way,
but by using slightly diﬀerent data. In the stringent score, the source has to
have the Theorem recorded almost verbatim, which shows up in the Appendix
tables as a tick in the appropriate box. In the more generous score, we allow
for more discrepancies, counting all marks in the boxes, except for T’s, S’s
and C’s 22 (see the notes after each table).
Our scoring system was chosen primarily because of its simplicity and its
fairness. In particular, while it is certainly not fair to give credit to a given
source for listing loads of so-called Theorems that no other source calls by
that name, it likewise is unfair to the other sources, not to penalise the given
source for having done so. Similarly, a source should be penalised for failing to
recognise as a Theorem, any statement that both of the other sources identiﬁed
as such. Note that, with this scoring system, the higher the score, the better.
We would hope that the scores for MATHsAiD would compare favourably
with the scores for the textbooks. That is to say, its score should be roughly
in the range of the other two, to which it is being compared.
Each of the tables below has the following key:
s – stringent criteria
g – generous criteria
T(c) – Number of Theorems listed by this source, under criteria c
A(c) – Number of Theorems this source alone listed, under criteria c
M(c) – Number of Theorems this source alone failed to list, under criteria c
MAT – MATHsAiD
Deﬁnition 4.1 Given the notation above, the score, under criteria c, for each
source is given by: Score(c) = (T(c) - 1.5A(c)) - M(c).
22 In each of these cases, it does not seem fair to give MATHsAiD credit for having discovered
– but discarded – the Theorems. However, in cases of G, for instance, the Theorems were
ﬁltered out precisely because of the sharpness criterion (which is adjustable by the user).
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Set Theory
Source T(s) A(s) M(s) Score(s) T(g) A(g) M(g) Score(g)
[9] 34 4 5 23 40 4 6 28
[12] 28 4 11 11 31 4 15 10
MAT 44 13 4 20.5 45 6 3 33
Positive Integers
Source T(s) A(s) M(s) Score(s) T(g) A(g) M(g) Score(g)
[4] 19 3 1 13.5 24 3 1 18.5
[10] 11 0 6 5 15 0 7 8
MAT 21 6 2 10 23 1 0 21.5
Group Theory
Source T(s) A(s) M(s) Score(s) T(g) A(g) M(g) Score(g)
[1] 6 0 2 4 7 0 2 5
[8] 9 1 0 7.5 9 0 0 9
MAT 8 0 0 8 8 0 1 7
Note that in each of the six sets of scores, MATHsAiD either scores the
highest, or second best.
5 Conclusions
We hoped to identify various criteria by which mathematicians determine
which theorems to designate as Theorems, in recognition of the importance
of this ability to separate the wheat from the chaﬀ – not only for mathemati-
cians, but potentially for artiﬁcial intelligence and machine learning systems
as well. We then wanted to incorporate these criteria into an automated sys-
tem, MATHsAiD, that would likewise discern between the two types of truths,
hoping to produce results comparable to those produced by the human math-
ematical process. In order to judge our results, we compared the Theorems
produced by MATHsAiD with Theorems listed in various mathematics text-
books.
We feel that, while there is still some room for improvement, not to men-
tion some work yet to be done, our eﬀorts can, on the whole, be considered
successful. It is true that we have thus far only worked with fairly simple
mathematical structures, and even then, only at an introductory level. How-
ever, these structures are quite diﬀerent from one another, and yet the results
are, arguably, at least, equally good in each area. Moreover, the fact that our
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methods are quite simple – yet eﬀective – would seem to be rather signiﬁcant.
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A Appendix
All the data contained here have been rewritten in standard mathematical notation, for the con-
venience of the reader. With one exception (the deﬁnition of intersection), the axioms/deﬁnitions
provided to MATHsAiD are essentially the same as those found in the textbooks used for compar-
ison.
A.1 Set Theory
The following are the set-theory axioms/deﬁnitions provided to MATHsAiD.
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Axioms: Given that A and B are sets;
1. ∀x, x /∈ ∅ 6. A ∩ B is a set
2. ∅ is a set 7. ∀x, [(x ∈ A or x ∈ B)⇐⇒ x ∈ A ∪B]
3. [∀x, (x ∈ A =⇒ x ∈ B)]⇐⇒ A ⊆ B 8. A ∪ B is a set
4. A = B ⇐⇒ [∀x, (x ∈ A ⇐⇒ x ∈ B)] 9. ∀x, [(x ∈ A and x /∈ B)⇐⇒ x ∈ A− B]
5. ∀x, [(x ∈ A and x ∈ B)⇐⇒ x ∈ A ∩ B] 10. A− B is a set
The following table contains the set-theory Theorems, as identiﬁed by MATHsAiD (MAT), [9], and
[12]. Assume throughout that A,B, and C are sets.
Theorems [9] [12] MAT
1. A ⊆ A.  
2. A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A =⇒ B = A.   
3. A ⊆ B and B ⊆ C =⇒ A ⊆ C.   
4. ∅⊆ A.  
5. A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A ⇐⇒ A = B. 
6. ∀x, x /∈ A ⇐⇒ ∅ = A.  
7. A ∩A = A.   
8. A ∩∅ = ∅.  
9. B ∩ A = A ∩B.   
10. (A ∩ B) ∩ C = A ∩ (B ∩C).   
11. A ∩ B ⊆ A.   
12. A ∩ B ⊆ B.  
13. A ⊆ B =⇒ A ∩B = A.   
14. A ⊆ B =⇒ A ∩C ⊆ B ∩C. G 
15. A ⊆ B =⇒ C ∩A ⊆ C ∩ B. G 
16. C ⊆ A and C ⊆ B =⇒ C ⊆ A ∩ B. D 
17. A ∪ A = A.   
18. A ∪∅ = A.   
19. B ∪A = A ∪ B.   
20. (A ∪ B) ∪ C = A ∪ (B ∪C).   
21. A ⊆ A ∪ B.   
22. B ⊆ A ∪B.  
23. A ⊆ B =⇒ A ∪B = B.   
24. A ⊆ B =⇒ A ∪C ⊆ B ∪C. G 
25. A ⊆ B =⇒ C ∪A ⊆ C ∪ B. G 
26. A ⊆ C and B ⊆ C =⇒ A ∪ B ⊆ C.  
27. A− A = ∅.  
28. A−∅ = A.  
29. ∅− A = ∅. 
30. B − (A− B) = B. 
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Theorems [9] [12] MAT
31. (A− B) −A = ∅. 
32. A− (A−B) = A ∩B. DEF 
33. (A− B) −B = A− B. 
34. (A− B) − C = A− (B ∪ C).  
35. (A− B) ∪ (A ∩ C) = A− (B − C).  
36. A− B ⊆ A. 
37. A ⊆ B =⇒ A−B = ∅.  
38. A ⊆ B =⇒ A− C ⊆ B − C. G 
39. (A ∪ B) ∩ (A ∪C) = A ∪ (B ∩C).  RHV 
40. (A ∩ B) ∪ (A ∩C) = A ∩ (B ∪C).  RHV 
41. (B ∩ C)− A = B ∩ (C − A).  
42. (B − A) ∪ (C −A) = (B ∪ C)− A.  
43. A ∩ B = A =⇒ A ⊆ B.   
44. A ∪ B = B =⇒ A ⊆ B.   
45. A− (A ∩B) = A−B.  
46. A ∩ (A−B) = A−B. 
47. (A− B) ∪B = A ∪B.  
48. (A ∪ B) −B = A−B. 
49. (A ∩ B) −B = ∅. 
50. (A− B) ∩B = ∅. 
51. (A− B) ∩ (A− C) = A− (B ∪ C).   S
52. (A− B) ∪ (A− C) = A− (B ∩ C).  
53. A ⊆ B ∧C ⊆ D =⇒ A ∪ C ⊆ B ∪D. 
54. A ⊆ B ∧C ⊆ D =⇒ A ∩ C ⊆ B ∩D. 
55. A ⊆ B ∧C ⊆ D =⇒ A−D ⊆ B − C. 
56. C ⊆ D =⇒ A−D ⊆ A− C. 
RHV – The right-hand version of this Theorem was listed in the book.
G – A more general version of this Theorem is listed in the text, and is given in the table (see Theorems
53, 54, and 55). Given the appropriate hypotheses, MATHsAiD actually ﬁnds the more general version,
but discards it, because of the sharpness criterion.
D – The dual of this Theorem (namely, number 26) is in the book.
DEF – This is given as the deﬁnition of intersection.
S – A simpler equality for the right hand side was found by MATHsAiD (namely Theorem 34).
NOTE: We have not yet implemented within MATHsAiD a system whereby previously discovered
Theorems are modiﬁed/deleted whenever subsuming Theorems are subsequently discovered. Hence, for
example, Theorem 2 remains, even after Theorem 5 has been discovered. Also, as indicated in section 4,
MATHsAiD sometimes reports both left- and right-handed versions of a Theorem, and at other times only
reports one version. This depends on a variety of factors, particularly the input (including the axioms)
provided to MATHsAiD, the previously discovered Theorems available, the nature/structure of the new
Theorem itself, and the circumstances surrounding the situation. We tend to view this behaviour as a posi-
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tive aspect of MATHsAiD, since this represents a phenomenon that can be observed amongst mathematics
textbooks as well (see also Theorems 10-21 in A.2).
A.2 Positive Integers
The following are the axioms/deﬁnitions for the positive integers (essentially as found in [4] – without
induction) provided to MATHsAiD. (NOTE: the last four axioms are the ﬁrst author’s own preference for
stating that an operation is well-deﬁned. See also the group axioms.)
Axioms: Given that a, b, c ∈ N ;
1. N is a set 11. (a = b) ∨ (∃x ∈ N s.t. a + x = b) ∨ (∃y ∈ N s.t. a = b + y)
2. 1 ∈ N 12. a = b =⇒ [(∀x ∈ N, a + x = b) ∧ (∀y ∈ N, a = b + y)]
3. a + b ∈ N 13. ∃x ∈ N s.t. a + x = b =⇒ [(a = b) ∧ (∀y ∈ N, a = b + y)]
4. a ∗ b ∈ N 14. ∃y ∈ N s.t. a = b + y =⇒ [(a = b) ∧ (∀x ∈ N, a + x = b)]
5. a + b = b + a 15. a < b ⇐⇒ ∃x ∈ N s.t. a + x = b
6. a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c 16. a = b =⇒ c + a = c + b
7. a ∗ b = b ∗ a 17. a = b =⇒ a + c = b + c
8. a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c 18. a = b =⇒ c ∗ a = c ∗ b
9. a ∗ (b + c) = (a ∗ b) + (a ∗ c) 19. a = b =⇒ a ∗ c = b ∗ c
10. a ∗ 1 = a
The following table contains the positive-integer Theorems, as identiﬁed by MATHsAiD (MAT), [4],
and [10]. Assume throughout that a, b, c ∈ N.
Theorems [4] [10] MAT
1. a ≮ a. E 
2. a < b and b < c =⇒ a < c.   
3. a = b ∨ a < b ∨ b < a.   
4. a = b =⇒ a ≮ b. H H 
5. a = b =⇒ b ≮ a. H H 
6. a < b =⇒ a = b. H H 
7. a < b =⇒ b ≮ a. H H 
8. a < a + b.  
9. b < a + b. 
10. a < b =⇒ a + c < b + c.   
11. a < b =⇒ c + a < c + b.  
12. a < b =⇒ a ∗ c < b ∗ c.   
13. a < b =⇒ c ∗ a < c ∗ b.  
14. c + a = c + b =⇒ a = b.  
15. a + c = b + c =⇒ a = b.   
16. c ∗ a = c ∗ b =⇒ a = b.  
17. a ∗ c = b ∗ c =⇒ a = b.   
18. a + c < b + c =⇒ a < b.   
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Theorems [4] [10] MAT
19, c + a < c + b =⇒ a < b.  
20. a ∗ c < b ∗ c =⇒ a < b.   
21. c ∗ a < c ∗ b =⇒ a < b.  
22. (b + c) ∗ a = b ∗ a + c ∗ a. 
23. 1 is unique.  C
24. 1 ∗ a = a.  T
25. a < b ∧ c < d =⇒ a + c < b + d.   G
26. a < b ∧ c < d =⇒ a ∗ c < b ∗ d.   G
E – This is left as an exercise for the student.
H – The text states Theorem 3 in terms of “exactly one” of the statements is true, which we trans-
late into “one and only one”. These Theorems represent the “only one” portion of that Theorem. The
MATHsAiD versions here (4, 5, 6, and 7) are a result of the way the axioms were provided to it.
C – This is ﬁltered out because the cancellation Theorems (see 16 and 17) were found ﬁrst.
T – This is ﬁltered out because it is considered too trivial, given the commutativity axiom for multi-
plication.
G – This is a more general version of a Theorem that MATHsAiD got (see 10, 11, 12, and 13). It is
ﬁltered out because of the sharpness criterion.
A.3 Groups
The following are the axioms/deﬁnitions for groups provided to MATHsAiD.
Axioms: Given that a, b, c ∈ G ;
1. G is a set 7. e ∗ a = a
2. a ∗ b ∈ G 8. a ∗ e = a
3. a = b =⇒ c ∗ a = c ∗ b 9. a−1 ∈ G
4. a = b =⇒ a ∗ c = b ∗ c 10. a ∗ a−1 = e
5. a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c 11. a−1 ∗ a = e
6. e ∈ G
The following table contains the group-theory Theorems, as identiﬁed by MATHsAiD (MAT), [1], and
[8]. Assume throughout that a, b, c ∈ G.
Theorems [1] [8] MAT
1. (a−1)−1 = a.  
2. b ∗ a = a =⇒ b = e.   
3. a ∗ b = a =⇒ b = e.   
4. b ∗ a = e =⇒ a−1 = b.   
5. a ∗ b = e =⇒ a−1 = b.   
6. (a ∗ b)−1 = b−1 ∗ a−1  
7. c ∗ a = c ∗ b =⇒ a = b.   
8. a ∗ c = b ∗ c =⇒ a = b.   
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Theorems [1] [8] MAT
9. c ∗ c = c =⇒ c = e. E  C
E – This is left as an exercise for the student.
C – This is ﬁltered out because the cancellation Theorems (see 7 and 8) were found ﬁrst.
NOTE: For those who were expecting to see the Theorems regarding unique solutions to the equations
a ∗ x = b and y ∗ a = b, we have not yet given MATHsAiD the ability to discover existence Theorems.
We expect to do so in the future. As for the theorem e−1 = e, it is perhaps somewhat interesting to
note that MATHsAiD indeed found this result. However, MATHsAiD agreed with the two textbooks, that
this result should not be called a Theorem. All other results one might expect to see in group theory
require more axioms/deﬁnitions than were presented to MATHsAiD (e.g., integer exponents, subgroups,
homomorphisms, etc.)
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